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DETERMINING UNIFORMITY WITHIN
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT BY MEASURING
DISSENT AND EN BANC REVIEW
Christopher A. Co tropia*
This Article adds to the empirical literature examining how the Federal
Circuit treats patent-law issues internally by comparing the decision
making of the Federal Circuit with that of other courts of appeals. It
does so by measuring two statistics from overall written opinions: the
percentage of dissents and the percentage of en bane reviews. The data
is taken from the Third, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, District of Columbia, and
Federal Circuits between 1998 and 2009. The data in the study show
that the Federal Circuit has the second-highest percentage of dissents
among the circuits studied (behind only the Ninth Circuit) and that it
has a percentage of en bane review statistically indistinguishable from
three of the other circuits studied. Based on these results, the Federal
Circuit does not appear to be a court of a single-mind, as some
commentators have suggested, at least as compared to other circuits.
Rather, there is a good deal of dissent compared to other courts of
appeals. This suggests that there are diverse views among Federal
Circuit judges and that these judges are willing to play an active and
vocal role in the law's development.

* Professor of Law, Intellectual Property Institute, University of Richmond Law School.
Thanks to Dawn-Marie Bey, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Arthur Hellman, Jim Gibson, Judge S. Jay
Plager, and Jack Preis for their comments on an earlier version of this Article. Special thanks to
Lee Petherbridge and the Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review staff, particularly Amanda Sherman,
for giving me the opportunity to present this paper at the symposium "The Federal Circuit as an
Institution." Special thanks also to the participants at the symposium for their comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the major critiques of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit is a structural one. Since the Federal Circuit is the
sole appellate court for a variety of legal areas (particularly patent
law), 1 the court's decision making becomes stagnant and entrenched.
As a result, the court has "retarded the pace of common law
development in some important ways." 2 This Article seeks to
empirically test this premise.
Scholars such as Lee Petherbridge have previously tested this
assumption by examining how the court internally treats specific
patent law issues. 3 This Article adds to this investigation by taking a
different, more macro approach: performing a comparison of the
Federal Circuit's decision making with the decision making of other
courts of appeals. The Article measures two metrics that provide
insight into how entrenched current thinking is in a given circuit: the
percentages of dissents 4 and of en bane reviews 5 in overall written
opinions. This Article analyzes these metrics for the Federal Circuit
and for five other circuits-the Third, Fifth, Tenth, Ninth, and
District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuits-from 1998 to 2009. 6
The data reveal two results. First, the Federal Circuit
experiences the second highest percentage of dissents among the
circuits studied, behind only the Ninth Circuit. 7 Second, the Federal
Circuit's percentage of en bane review is relatively low but
I. See 28 U.S.C. § l295(a) (2006).
2. Randall R. Rader, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The
Promise and Perils of a Court of Limited Jurisdiction, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. l, 4
(2001).
3. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421 (2009)
(studying the uniformity of the Federal Circuit, focusing particularly on the court's doctrine of
equivalents jurisprudence); see also R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment ofJudicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004)
(looking at the Federal Circuit's claim interpretation case law).
4. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
5. Judge Plager and Lynne Pettigrew mention en bane review as a mechanism by which
precedent can change in a court of exclusive appellate jurisdiction. S. Jay Plager & Lynne
Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard and DuffY, 101
Nw. u. L. REv. 1735, 1753-54 (2007).
6. For a study employing a similar approach with respect to indeterminacy in the Federal
Circuit, see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and
Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025 (2007) (comparing dissent rates
between the Federal Circuit and other circuits on questions of indeterminacy in legal
interpretation).
7. See infra Part III. B.!.
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statistically indistinguishable from those of three other circuits
studied. 8 Implications of these results are discussed in more detail
below, but one thing is fairly clear: the data suggest that the Federal
Circuit is no more lacking in jurisprudential diversity than other
circuits and, considering dissents, is significantly more internally
diverse in viewpoints regarding the outcomes of individual cases.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Creation of the Federal Circuit and the
Quest for Uniformity 9

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in
1982. 10 Congress formed the Federal Circuit in response to a
perceived crisis in the federal courts system and, more particularly,
in the judicial handling and development of patent law. 11 Prior to the
creation of the Federal Circuit, patent cases, while within the original
jurisdiction of the federal district courts, were appealed to the
appropriate regional circuit. 12 Certain patent issues could also be
decided by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), 13
which had exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from decisions made
by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). 14 The CCPA did
8. See infra Part III.B.2.
9. This part is adapted from an earlier article I authored. See Christopher A. Cotropia,
"Arising Under" Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REv. 253, 259-61 (2003).
10. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of28 U.S.C.).
II. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-23 (1981); S. REP. No. 97-275, at I, 5-6 (1981),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. II, II, 15-16; Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedure: Recommendations for Change, reprinted in
67 F.R.D. 195, 213-16, 361-76 (1975) [hereinafter Hruska Commission]; Thomas H. Case &
Scott R. Miller, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
301, 301 (1984); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. I, 6-8 (1989); Emmette F. Hale, III, The "Arising Under"
Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: An Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 229, 238-41 (1986). There are those who contest this history as to why Congress created
the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Cecil D. Quillen, Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. L. &
Bus. REv. 207, 226-30 (2006).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1976) (indicating that, prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit,
patent cases appealed from district courts went to regional circuits); see also H.R. REP. NO. 97312, at 23-24 (stating that patent appeals from district courts will go to the Federal Circuit instead
of to the regional circuit).
13. H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 19, 23-24 (noting that patent issues could also be decided by
the Court of Claims).
14. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 6.
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not have appellate review jurisdiction over claims of patent
infringement filed in district court, leaving the decisions on patent
enforcement to be made by regional circuits. 15 With this division of
labor between the CCPA and regional circuits, some regional
circuits' patent law differed greatly from that of the CCPA and the
USPT0. 16
Further division on patent law issues arose among the regional
circuits themselves. The handling of patent appeals by multiple
circuits led to circuit splits on different patent law issues. 17 Certain
regional circuits gained a reputation as being pro-patentee, while
other circuits were perceived as being patent unfriendly. 18 The U.S.
Supreme Court's docket was overloaded, and the number of patent
cases in which the Court granted certiorari was dwindling. 19 The
CCPA, while a central location for all appeals from USPTO
administrative decisions, had little to no influence on the decisions of
the regional circuits on nonadministrative patent issues. 20 The
handling of patent appeals by regional circuits, coupled with the
Supreme Court's inability to resolve conflicts among the circuits due
to docket overload, created a lack of uniformity in patent law across
the United States. 21 The fact that certain circuits were both
doctrinally and statistically beneficial for the alleged infringer, while
others were not, led to forum shopping by patentees and alleged
infringers. 22 Parties commonly raced each other to the courthouse,
15. See, e.g., Dawn-Marie Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the
Patent Office's "Broadest Reasonable Interpretation" Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 285, 298 n.65
(2009).
16. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 18 (1966) (noting that the there was "a
notorious difference between the standards [of patentability] applied by the Patent Office and by
the courts").
17. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-23; Hruska Commission, supra note II, at 361-76.
18. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-21 (noting that some circuits were considered propatent and others anti-patent); Hruska Commission, supra note II, at 370 (noting that
"[p]atentees now scramble to get into the 5th, 6th and 7th circuits since the courts there are not
inhospitable to patents whereas infringers scramble to get anywhere but in these circuits"); see
also Dreyfuss, supra note II, at 6-7 ("Statistics demonstrate that in the period 1945-1957, a
patent was twice as likely to be held valid and infringed in the Fifth Circuit than in the Seventh
Circuit, and almost four times more likely to be enforced in the Seventh Circuit than in the
Second Circuit.").
19. See Hruska Commission, supra note II, at 209-10,214-15, 220.
20. See Dreyfuss, supra note II, at 6.
21. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-21; S. REP. No. 97-275, at 3 (1981), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 13.
22. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20-21; Hruska Commission, supra note II, at 220, 370.
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each trying to file its case first in the forum most favorable to it,
exacerbating the disjointedness in patent doctrine among circuits. 23
In the early 1980s, Congress set out to remedy these perceived
problems in the patent system. The Hruska Commission, which
studied the caseload crisis in the federal courts, suggested a patent
court to sit between the regional circuits and the Supreme Court. 24
Congress relied on the results of the commission's study but adopted
a different solution: creating a single forum for hearing patent
appeals, both from district courts and the USPTO, and sitting at the
same level as the other regional courts of appeals. 25 The court,
named the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, would
assume the jurisdiction of the CCPA and obtain jurisdiction over
appeals from patent cases before federal district courts. 26
Congress believed that the Federal Circuit, being "[a] single
court of appeals for patent cases[,] [would] promote certainty where
it [was] lacking to a significant degree and [would] reduce, if not
eliminate, the forum-shopping that" existed at the time. 27 In other
words, the Federal Circuit was created to bring uniformity to the
development and application ofU.S. patent law.
B. The Critique of Too Much Uniformity

One of the critiques related to the Federal Circuit is that
Congress was, in a way, too successful-the Federal Circuit creates
too much uniformity in patent law. 28 For example, Craig Nard and
John Duffy recently articulated the concern that "[t]he Federal
23. H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 21; Hruska Commission, supra note 11, at 220, 370; see also
Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 6-7 (noting "that forum shopping was rampant" and led to bitter
fights over venue transfers).
24. Hruska Commission, supra note 11, at 236-47; Case & Miller, supra note 11, at 302.
Some disagree with the Hruska Commission's proposal. See, e.g., Quillen, supra note 11, at 22729.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 18; S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2-3.
26. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 18-19; S. REP. No. 97-275, at 2-3. Note that in addition to
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases, the Federal Circuit has other areas of appellate
jurisdiction. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 18.
27. H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 22; see also S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5 ("The establishment of
the court of appeals for the Federal Circuit also provides a forum that will increase doctrinal
stability in the field of patent law.").
28. There is also a common critique that runs in the other direction-that Federal Circuit law
is too disjointed, with conflict between many panel decisions and multiple inconsistencies in
patent law doctrine. See, e.g., Kevin Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L.
1083, 1087 n.18 (2009) (collecting citations critiquing the internal consistency of the Federal
Circuit's enablement case law).
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Circuit has been accused of producing an isolated and sterile
jurisprudence." 29 There are many reasons for this possible
uniformity. First, the judges' chambers are in a singular location, the
same location where the court hears cases. 30 Second, the judges must
live within fifty miles of the court's Washington, D.C., location. 31 As
a result, many of the court's judges resided and worked inside the
Beltway before joining the court. Third, the court addresses a
singular, finite subject matter, and it is the only appellate court that
addresses that subject matter. 32 This specialized and exclusive
jurisprudence insulates the court. 33 All of these factors place the
court in, essentially, a closed universe where there is even "a closed
cycle between the court and the attorneys who practice before it." 34
Stare decisis then entrenches this myopic view of patent law, and the
court's other exclusive areas of jurisdiction, forcing future panels to
follow the same, close-minded view of a previous panel. As a result,
there is "less percolation [and] less chance of experimentation" on
the legal issues heard by the Federal Circuit. 35
The law that results from such extreme uniformity is singleminded and changes infrequently. Many critics see this result as
incredibly unsatisfactory, particularly because, in their view, the
embedded legal regime is harmful to society. 36 Most critics focus on
the court's patent law jurisprudence, blaming the Federal Circuit's
single-mindedness and lack of innovation on the subject as one of the
main reasons the patent system is so damaged. 37 These critics
29. Craig Nard & John Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1619, 1620--21 (2007).
30. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit: About the Court,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html ("The court is located in the Howard T. Markey
National Courts Building on historic Lafayette Square in Washington, D.C.") (last visited Feb. 2,
2010).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 44( c) (2006) (requiring all Federal Circuit judges to "reside within fifty
miles of the District of Columbia").
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006) (defining the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit). Recent cases have eroded this exclusivity. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002); Cotropia, supra note 9, at 286-302 (explaining
how the Holmes decision disturbed the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction).
33. Nard & Duffy, supra note 29, at 1622-24.
34. /d. at 1622.
35. Rader, supra note 2, at 4.
36. See, e.g., Quillen, supra note 11, at 218-25 (noting the effects of increased innovation
costs caused by the Federal Circuit's lowered patentability standards).
37. See, e.g., Nard & Duffy, supra note 29, at 1620--22.
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contend that the court's groupthink on patent issues has created a
patent system that is incredibly one-sided, favoring patentees in
particular. The resulting jurisprudence ultimately has a negative
effect on innovation in the United States and abroad. 38
C. Previous Empirical Studies on the
Level of Uniformity

One question this critique presents is whether there is empirical
proof that the court's jurisprudence results in uniformity and an
accompanying lack of diversity on patent law issues at the Federal
Circuit. As Federal Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager and Lynne Pettigrew
so aptly put it, there is "no showing" of this fundamental assumption
by critics. 39
Studies that attempt to prove that the Federal Circuit is propatentee mainly aim to show that the Federal Circuit rarely finds
patents invalid. One example is Glynn Lunney's study of Federal
Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence in 2001. 40 Lunney's study
spanned eight different years over a fifty-year period and examined
the percentage of patents found invalid by the Federal Circuit, and its
predecessor court and regional circuits, due to a finding of
obviousness. 41 The study revealed a drop in the percentage of patents
found obvious in the later years, and Lunney attributed this drop to
the introduction of the Federal Circuit and the doctrinal changes to
nonobviousness that the court introduced. 42
These types of studies have little use for the uniformity question.
While the ultimate result may be uniform-here, a low
nonobviousness standard-this does not mean that the actual
standard being used by the court did not evolve over time, albeit to
lower the nonobviousness requirement. Nor does it mean that the
court was actually uniform in its recitation and application (other
than producing a similar final result of invalidity). These studies
38. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 771, 773 (2003);
see Nard & Duffy, supra note 29, at 1622.
39. SeeS. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle:
A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1735, 1756 (2007).
40. See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., £-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363,
370--75 (2001).
41. See id. at 371 n.34, 372 n.36 (using previous studies to obtain data for the six pre-Federal
Circuit data points and collecting data for the final two Federal Circuit data points).
42. See id. at 372-80 (citing both the suggestion test and elevation of secondary
considerations as the doctrinal changes responsible for the reduction in obvious findings).
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focus on the outcome, as opposed to the particulars of the
development of jurisprudence within the court. 43
Others have dug deeper into Federal Circuit doctrine. In 2004,
Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge studied the Federal Circuit's
claim interpretation, finding differing methodological approaches by
various members of the court. 44 While not the main goal of the
authors, such a result shows a lack of uniformity at least in the
application of patent doctrine. In 2009, Petherbridge looked at the
Federal Circuit's doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence with the
specific goal of testing Nard and Duffy's hypothesis ofuniformity in
Federal Circuit doctrine. 45 Petherbridge found a great deal of
"jurisprudential diversity" regarding the doctrine. 46 In fact, as he
notes, "the results of this study at least allow for the opposite
interpretation [from Nard and Duffy's]: Federal Circuit jurisprudence
might be too diverse." 47

III.

STUDY

A. Scope
All of the previous studies are important and provide insight into
how insular and homogeneous the Federal Circuit is. This study
hopes to add to this understanding by looking at uniformity on a
macro level. Thus, this study examines how diverse the Federal
Circuit's legal views are, regardless of subject matter or even a
particular doctrine within a subject area. Such a study will hopefully,
in conjunction with those studies done before, provide an even more
complete picture about the jurisprudential diversity, or lack thereof,
ofthe Federal Circuit.
The study takes this macro level look by measuring two
occurrences-dissents and en bane review. As explained in more

43. Such a focus is not surprising given that these studies are looking at measuring not
uniformity but rather the substantive impact the court's jurisprudence has on patents and society.
44. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1125-26, 1129-36,
1171-72 (2004).
45. See Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 427-28
(2009).
46. /d. at 428.
47. /d.
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depth below, the presence of these two objective markers is evidence
of diversity, at some level, among the judges of an appellate court.
1. Dissents
The first category of data taken is the number of dissents within
a circuit. More particularly, the study measures the proportion of
dissents to written decisions.
Dissents are relevant to the question of uniformity because they
are, at their most basic, disagreements among judges. 48 Dissents
show a division among the judges of a court, specifically those on a
particular panel, on a given legal issue. 49 Dissents at the appellate
level are usually the result of disagreement as to what the law is or as
to the application of the law to the given facts of a particular case. 50
Because of the standards of review in play, 51 dissents are rarely
disagreements about the facts of a particular case. Dissents show that
the "appellate bench is not of one mind" and that "monolithic
solidarity" does not exist on a given court. 52
Additionally, dissents are said to maintain a court's "intellectual
vibrancy," communicating differing legal ideas to those within and
outside the court. 53 Commentators have identified dissents as part of
"law[' s] laboratory" 54 and as "an antidote for judicial lethargy." 55 A
dissent signals to litigants the narrowness of the majority's holding
and the possibility that small changes in the facts can change the
results. 56 Dissents also can form the basis for a change in the law
within the circuit or at the legislative level. 57
48. See Stanley H. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 923,926 (1962); Arthur
D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U. PITT. L. REv.
1029, 1038-43 (1999) (using dissents to measure the level of unpredictability in the courts).
49. Fuld, supra note 48, at 926-27.
50. See Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REv. 11, 59 n.277 (1996) ("The courts of appeals essentially apply a twotiered standard of review now: de novo review (for questions of law) and a more deferential
standard, such as abuse of discretion (for review of factual determinations and conduct of the
trial.") (citation omitted)).
51. See id.
52. See Robert G. Flanders Jr., The Utility of Separate Judicial Opinions in Appellate Courts
of Last Resort: Why Dissents Are Valuable, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 401,406 (1999).
53. Id. at407.
54. See id.
55. Fuld, supra note 48, at 927.
56. /d.
57. /d.
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This study determined the number of dissents and written
opinions the Federal Circuit and five other circuit courts issued per
year, on a fiscal year basis (October to September), from 1998 to
2009. 58 The number of dissents and the number of written opinions
were obtained by electronic searches on Westlaw. 59
The study counted dissents as a singular event for every opinion
that included a dissent. Thus, even if there were multiple dissents to a
single written opinion, these dissents were collectively counted as a
single dissent. This does have the potential for undercounting the
level of disagreement. But the occurrence of two dissents to a single
panel opinion is extremely rare at the intermediate appellate court
level given that most panels are composed of three judges and
multiple dissents would therefore actually constitute a majority. 60
One other important point about the data collected is that
dissents were counted if they appeared in any written opinion
available on Westlaw, whether in an opinion selected for publication
or in one that was not. 61 Also, the study counted dissents that
appeared in written opinions in non-merit-based situations. 62 The
study included the full range of dissents because the study views
dissents as external markers of disagreement among the judges in a
given circuit. Regardless of whether a decision was published,
unpublished, or made by a motions panel, a dissent in that case
indicates disagreement within the court.
58. The other circuits are the Third, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits. While the Fifth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuit were chosen at random, the Ninth and D.C. Circuits were purposely
chosen. The Ninth Circuit was chosen because of its notoriety for a high level of discord within
the circuit. See Robert A. Katz, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the Constitution to
U.S. Territories, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 779, 779 (1992). The D.C. Circuit was chosen because of the
characteristics it shares with the Federal Circuit-singular location and somewhat specialized
jurisdiction in administrative law. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2006) (establishing the D.C. Circuit's
jurisdiction over a number of administrative law matters).
59. The existence of a dissent during the fiscal year 2008-2009, for example, was
determined by the following search: "dis(judge) & da(aft 9/30/2008 & bef 10/112009)".
Essentially, every dissent has an author, a 'judge," associated with it. For the number of written
opinions during the 2008-2009 fiscal year, the following search was used: "da(aft 9/30/2008 &
bef 1011/2009) & court." The additional term "court" is added because Westlaw does not allow
date only searches, and the term "court" appears in all opinions because they originate from a
court of appeals.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006) (noting that court of appeals shall determine cases with "not
more than three judges"). However, en bane decisions include more than three judges, and there
may be any number of dissents. !d.
61. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.l(a) (stating that courts of appeals cannot prohibit citation to
"unpublished" or "non-precedential" decisions).
62. For example, dissents to orders were counted as "dissents" for this study's purposes.
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To properly compare circuits, a metric was necessary to
normalize the number of dissents in a given circuit. Without a
determination of the proportion of dissents to the opportunities to
dissent, it would be impossible to compare circuits because of the
varied workloads among courts of appeals. Thus, this study used the
number of written decisions appearing on Westlaw as the base for
any given circuit. 63 As with the data on dissents, the number of
written opinions included all available written opinions. This
included published and unpublished decisions, summary
affirmances, 64 and decisions on procedural matters.
There was an alternative source of data for this study. The
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) produces an annual
report entitled Annual Report of the Director. 65 This report includes,
among other things, the number of cases terminated by each court of
appeals per fiscal year. 66 The AO report also includes the number of
merits terminations per year. 67
This study uses the Westlaw data instead of the AO data for two
reasons. First, the AO report does not count dissents, and once
Westlaw is used to collect one set of data, consistency dictates using
the same database for related data. Second, the AO report does not
clarify the meaning of "termination" of an appealed case or, more
importantly, of "merit-based" termination of a case. 68 The concept of
merits decisions seems too narrow for this study, given that discord
in non-merit-based situations is still evidence of discord and should
be included. Additionally, the total number of terminations seems too
broad given that this data could include terminations in situations in
which judges never had the opportunity to voice disagreement. 69
For the Federal Circuit, the data were further coded to identify
which of the opinions and dissents were in patent cases. The study
63. See note 59, supra, for a description of how the number of written opinions was
obtained.
64. See FED. CIR. R. 36 (identifying the Federal Circuit's procedure to affirm without
opinion).
65. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (U.S. Gov't Printing Office
2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/Judicia1Businespdfversion.pdf.
66. See, e.g., id. at 42 tbi.S-1.
67. See, e.g., id. at 43 tbi.S-2.
68. See, e.g., id.
69. For example, cases could be terminated because parties settled or because the clerk's
office rejected an appeal for improper filing.
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defined "patent case" broadly to include any case involving a patent
law issue, no matter how tangential that issue was to the main issues
in the case, 70 rather than focusing solely on determinations of patent
infringement or patent invalidity. The aim of this search was to get
specific data on the level of uniformity on patent issues, which is of
particular interest to those examining uniformity within the Federal
Circuit. 71
2. En Bane Reviews
The second category of data taken is the number of en bane
reviews within a circuit. More particularly, this study measures the
proportion of en bane reviews to written decisions.
Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, an "en bane
hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered
unless: (1) en bane consideration is necessary to secure or maintain
uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a
question of exceptional importance." 72 Tracey George noted multiple
theories for such review in her empirical study of the reasons en bane
review is granted. 73 Of importance to this Article, she noted that both
intracircuit conflict-a conflict among panel opinions and judges on
a legal issue-and the existence of dissenting judges on a legal issue
can be reasons for en bane review. 74 Indeed, George found that there
was a statistically significant relationship between both intracircuit
conflict and the existence of a dissenting judge on an earlier panel
and the grant of en bane review. 75
70. The search was done electronically, looking for any use of the term "patent" in the
majority opinion or dissenting opinion, using the following search: "op(patent!) dis(patent!) &
da(aft 9/30/1998 & bef I 0/1/2009)." In addition, to ensure the recording of summary affrrmances
under Rule 36, an electronic search was done to determine where the underlying opinion was
being appealed from. This is based on the assumption that most patent cases come from the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, the U.S. district courts, and the International Trade Commission.
An example of such a search is "(r.36) & (appeal /4 ('united states district court' 'international
trade commission' 'united states patent and trademark office') & da(aft 9/30/1998 & bef
10/1/2009))". This search has the potential to be overinclusive by including, for example, Rule 36
affrrmances of trademark appeals. However, the number of unintended results is likely low.
Regardless, any error would push the results more toward evidence of uniformity, because it
would dilute the percentage of dissents.
71. See supra Part II.B.
72. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
73. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Bane
Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999).
74. !d. at 249.
75. !d. at 254, 259-60.
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This relationship makes en bane review relevant to the question
ofuniformity. If the Federal Circuit has a high level ofuniformity on
a legal issue, and thus little intracircuit conflict and few dissenting
opinions on that issue, then there should be little en bane review.
There would be no need.
This study collected data on the granting of en bane review in a
slightly different manner than that regarding dissents. Instead of
obtaining the data from electronic Westlaw searches, the study used
data from the AO report. 76 The time period for which data were
collected ran from 1998 to 2009. 77
The analysis of the en bane data used the same base for
comparison as did the dissent analysis: the number of written
opinions by the given circuit during the defined time period as
collected on Westlaw. While using a combination of AO and
Westlaw data violates the consistency standard mentioned above
with respect to dissents, 78 the results are more accurate because
almost all written decisions are instances in which en bane review is
a viable option. 79 By contrast, using a narrower base provided in the
same AO data, such as the number of petitions for rehearing en bane,
would fail to take into account the ability for a circuit to go en bane
sua sponte. 80 Alternatively, a broader base, such as the number of
total terminations or merit terminations, would include situations in
which en bane review was not available. Still, there remains the
potential for undercounting opportunities for en bane review because
unwritten decisions still present instances where en bane review is
possible.

76. The Federal Circuit data were obtained from the court's Web site, since the data are not
directly available in the AO report. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,
PETITIONS FOR REHEARING FILED AND GRANTED, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/
PetitionsforRehearingFiledandGranted99-08.pdf.
77. The latest AO report available is the 2009 report, which is available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html.
78. See supra Part III.A.1.
79. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
80. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1291 n.l (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en
bane) (going en bane sua sponte for a portion of the opinion).
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B. Results
1. Dissents
Using the data described above, this study first calculated the
percentage of total opinions that included a dissent. Table 1 below
reports the total number of written opinions, the total number of
dissents, and the resulting percentage of dissents over the full period
studied, 1998-2009. 81
TABLE

1

Third
Circuit

Fifth
Circuit

Ninth
Circuit

Tenth
Circuit

D.C.
Circuit

Federal
Circuit

Total Number
of Opinions

18,580

38,653

53,177

16,587

7,832

15,319

Total Number
of Dissents

432

439

2424

422

234

538

Percentage of
Dissents

2.33%

1.14%

4.56%

2.54%

2.99%

3.51%

Only the Ninth Circuit, with a dissent rate of 4.56 percent, had a
higher dissent rate than the Federal Circuit, with 3.51 percent. The
D.C. Circuit, with 2.99 percent, was just behind the Federal Circuit.
The difference in dissent rates between the Federal Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit 82 and the difference between the Federal Circuit and
the D.C. Circuit 83 are statistically significant. 84
81. This data can also be viewed as a function of time (and was collected in such a manner);
however, for the purposes of this Article such information is not particularly relevant.
82. Using Pearson's chi-squared test yields a P value of less than 0.0001. Pearson's chisquared test determines whether a difference is statistically significant. See generally MICHAEL
0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 157-62 (2d ed. 2001) (describing
Pearson's chi-squared test). That is, the test measures the likelihood that the observed difference
in percentages is too extreme to be caused by chance. /d.
83. Pearson's chi-squared test produces a P value of0.0243.
84. For the distribution to be statistically significant, a P value must be less than 0.05. See
DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 484 (3d ed. 1998). A P value less than 0.01 is considered
highly statistically significant. !d. Thus, the differences between the Federal Circuit and the Ninth
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The patent-specific data, internal to the Federal Circuit, are
reported below in table 2, beside the general Federal Circuit data
already reported.
TABLE2

Federal Circuit
(Overall)

Federal Circuit
(Patent Only)

Total Number of
Opinions

15,319

3,504

Total Number of
Dissents

538

325

Percentage of
Dissents

3.51%

9.28%

It is initially worth noting that patent opmwns appear to
represent a small percentage of overall opinions-roughly 23
percent. But given that patent cases make up about a third of the
Federal Circuit's docket, this result makes sense. 85 Any concern with
underreporting written patent opinions is diminished because of the
overinclusive method of counting opinions as patent cases. 86
It is also worth noting that the percentage of dissents in patent
opinions is higher than that for Federal Circuit opinions overall. This
difference is highly statistically significant. 87

2. En Bane Reviews
As with dissents, this study calculated the percentage of en bane
reviews in relation to total opinions. Table 3 below reports the total
number of written opinions, the number of en bane opinions, and the
Circuit (P value of less than 0.0001) and between the Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit (P
value of0.0243) are both statistically significant.
85. See, e.g., U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, ADJUDICATIONS BY MERJTS
PANELS, BY CATEGORY, FY 2008 (2009), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/
ChartAdjudications08.pdf (showing patent cases making up 35 percent of merits panel
adjudications).
86. See supra note 70.
87. Pearson's chi-squared test produces a P value ofless than 0.0001. See supra note 84.
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resulting percentage of en bane review over the full period studied,
from 1998 through 2009. 88
TABLE

3

Third
Circuit

Fifth
Circuit

Ninth
Circuit

Tenth
Circuit

D.C.
Circuit

Federal
Circuit

Total Number
of Opinions

18,580

38,653

53,177

16,587

7,832

15,319

Total Number
of En Bane
Opinions

39

82

202

53

19

28

Percentage
of En Bane
Opinions

0.21%

0.21%

0.38%

0.32%

0.24%

0.18%

The Federal Circuit had the lowest rate of en bane review, with
0.18 percent of its opinions the subject of en bane review. The Third
Circuit and Fifth Circuit are the closest to the Federal Circuit, with
0.21 percent each. The difference between these three circuits is not
statistically significant. 89 Nor is the difference between the Federal
Circuit and the D.C Circuit statistically significant, albeit both are
close. 90 Thus, the rates of en bane review are essentially the same for
these four courts of appeals. The difference is not statistically
significant except in the comparison of the Federal Circuit with the
Tenth Circuit 91 and the Ninth Circuit. 92

88. The study did not include a patent-only, internal comparison for the Federal Circuit
because the AO data (which were used to obtain en bane grant figures for the court) did not
specifically identify patent en bane figures. Although the specific data can be obtained, all of the
en bane data would need to be obtained in the same manner for comparison purposes.
89. Pearson's chi-squared test produces a P value of 0.1492.
90. Both comparisons yield a Pearson's chi-squared test P value of0.0596.
91. Pearson's chi-squared test produces a P value of0.0015.
92. Pearson's chi-squared test produces a P value ofless than 0.0001.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS

A. Comparatively High Percentage of Dissents

Based on the data, the Federal Circuit exhibits a statistically
higher percentage of dissents than four of the other five courts of
appeals studied. Only one circuit, the Ninth Circuit, dissents more
often. 93
Such a result falls in line with other empirical studiesspecifically Wagner and Petherbridge's 2004 study and
Petherbridge's 2009 study. 94 Just as the Federal Circuit was diverse
in its views on claim interpretation and the doctrine of equivalents, 95
the court also appears to voice its diversity on individual cases more
often than other circuits. This high rate of dissent pushes against the
notion of overuniformity within the circuit. Instead of experiencing
groupthink, in which everyone follows the particular thinking on a
given subject established by the last judge, the Federal Circuit has a
fair share of discord. 96
However, the high rate of dissent observed in the Federal Circuit
could be due to other factors. First, the relatively low caseload of the
Federal Circuit as compared with other circuits 97 could be
responsible for the discord. The argument is that the less time judges
have to decide cases, the less time they have to dissent-a situation
that results in fewer dissents. Put another way, other circuits would
have a higher rate of dissent if not for their higher workloads.
However, the data do not support this thinking. The circuit with a
much higher load then the Federal Circuit-the Ninth Circuitexhibits the highest percentage of dissents. 98
93. The Ninth Circuit's large size may contribute to this result because a larger circuit may
encourage judges to disagree. See, e.g., Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, 79 A.B.A. J.
70, 70-71 (1993) (noting that the size of the Ninth Circuit may have a negative effect on
collegiality).
94. See supra notes 44-45.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
96. Notably, this study can only report general disagreement within the court. The study
does not look to see whether the disagreement is on specific substantive areas of law. While this
is defmitely a shortcoming of the study, the existence of dissent without regard to particular legal
issues still evidences Federal Circuit judges' willingness to disagree.
97. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 65, at 42 tbi.S-1, 128 tbi.B-8
(showing that the Federal Circuit has fewer terminations of appeals than all other circuits except
the First and D.C. Circuits for the fiscal year 2008).
98. See Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Bane: The Common Law Process in the Large
Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915, 981-82 (1991) (studying cases with dissents in the Ninth
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Second, an argument can be made that it is not just about
caseload but about caseload in the context of the number of judges
within a given circuit. The results could be coded on a per-judge
basis to take this concern into account. The initial difficulty in doing
this coding is determining the number of judges on a given circuit at
any given time. 99 Additionally, the data used for this study suggest
that the Federal Circuit's percentage of dissents per opinion and per
judge would still be one of the highest. With the results divided by
judge for the 2008-2009 period, the Third Circuit had 0.0013%,
Fifth Circuit had 0.0007%, the Ninth Circuit had 0.0014%, the Tenth
Circuit had 0.0025%, D.C. Circuit had 0.0061%, and the Federal
Circuit had 0.0040%. 100 The D.C Circuit comes out with a higher
rate of dissent, but the Federal Circuit is still ahead of other circuits,
even the Ninth Circuit. If anything, this analysis makes the Ninth
Circuit's high percentage of dissents look less impressive because
the high percentage is possibly attributable to its high number of
judges in relation to its caseload. 101
Third, the results could be due to one or two judges on the
Federal Circuit making up a majority of the dissents. If this were the
case, there would not be a true disagreement among the judges on the
whole court but simply a few outliers who were doing the lion's
share of dissenting. Thus, a majority of the court would still be of a
single mind.
To test this alternative rationale, the study reexamined the data
for 2008-2009 to identify specific dissenters. Judges were identified
as dissenting on a given case even if they simply joined a dissent but

Circuit); Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit,
and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 417-19 (1998).
99. The number of judges varies at any time based on how many active judges the circuit has
and the number of judges both entering and leaving to sit by designation. See, e.g., U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov (last visited Feb. 28, 2010); U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit: About the Court, supra note 30.
100. This study used the currently identified number of judges for a given circuit taken
directly from the Web site for each court of appeals. Active judges were counted as one judge,
and senior judges were counted as 0.15 judge, given that senior judges "typically handle about 15
percent of the federal courts' workload annually." U.S. Courts Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2010). Accordingly, the Third Circuit had
13.35 judges, the Fifth Circuit had 16.9 judges, the Ninth Circuit had 30.15 judges, the Tenth
Circuit had 12.35 judges, the D.C. Circuit had 9.75 judges, and the Federal Circuit had 11.75
judges at the time of writing.
101. See supra note 93.
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did not write it, 102 because those judges still disagreed with the
majority's opinion. From this further examination, Judge Newman
had the highest number of dissents-eighteen-while most of the
other judges had between three and seven dissents. 103 The judges
who dissented most often accounted for forty of the dissents during
that year. Judge Newman is definitely an outlier, but then nine other
judges fall within the same narrow range. Thus, while Judge
Newman is driving the disagreement, others are joining in, and the
participation is fairly even and widespread.
This leaves the question of why the Federal Circuit disagrees so
frequently. Are the judges on the Federal Circuit just not that friendly
a group and more apt to air their differences publicly? A more likely
explanation is that the repeated exposure to the same subject matter
results in more diverse viewpoints. The deeper judges get into a
particular subject, the more likely they are to develop their own
opinions, and the further developed and more nuanced these opinions
become. Other circuits have a larger breadth of cases than the
Federal Circuit at the expense of depth in a particular subject matter,
and this perhaps explains why these circuits, with the exception of
the Ninth Circuit, have a lower percentage of dissents. 104
The high percentage of dissents in the D.C Circuit, as compared
with other circuits studied, may be evidence of the same thing. The
D.C Circuit is specialized in some subject matter areas, such as
administrative law, because of its limited and unique geographic
scope. 105 There are, however, other, more obvious reasons for the
high rate of disagreement, such as the highly political nature of the
court. 106 But the fact that the D.C. Circuit handles certain subject
102. This is a situation that could occur, for example, in an en bane decision.
103. As described in note 59, supra, the existence of a dissent during the 2008-2009 fiscal
year can be determined by the following search: "disGudge) & da(aft 9/30/2008 & bef
10/1/2009)." Running this search in the Federal Circuit database in Westlaw yielded fifty-three
cases with dissenting opinions in the Federal Circuit during the 2008-2009 fiscal year. The
results also contained two denials for a petition to rehear en bane in which multiple judges
dissented; these were not included in this test.
104. Of course, this logic would not apply to the Ninth Circuit, which has a higher percentage
of dissents. See supra Part UI.B.1.
105. See John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of
Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 553, 554-57 (2010) (documenting the similar,
semi-specialized nature of the D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit); Harold H. Bruff,
Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1193, 1202-D3 ( 1992).
106. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,
83 VA. L. REv. 1717, 1738-43, 1759-60 (1997)(fmding, for example, that Democratic judges on

Spring 2010]

DETERMINING UNIFORMITY

821

matters more often than other subject matters may foster more
diverse viewpoints and result in more dissents for the same reason it
does in the Federal Circuit.
Regardless of the explanation, the results of this study push
against the conclusion that the Federal Circuit experiences
groupthink, in which ideas become entrenched and the court acts as a
cohesive unit. 107 In comparison with other circuit court judges,
Federal Circuit judges think more independently and are willing to
express their distinct viewpoints through dissents.
This independence of thought is particularly evident when it
comes to patent law issues, in which the percentage of dissents is
even higher than the percentage of dissents overall. 108 The higher rate
of dissent is not surprising given the complex, 109 high-stakes
nature 110 of patent cases. Based on this study's data, it is more
common for judges to have a difference of opinion on a patent issue
and take the time to articulate such a disagreement than to do so on
other issues.
B. Comparatively Low Percentage of
En Bane Reviews
By contrast, the data for en bane opinions may tell a different
story. While dissents do not immediately result in legal change or
have a legal impact, 111 en bane reviews can have an overt effect: they
can change existing law. 112 Thus, the rate of en bane reviews may be

the D.C. Circuit were significantly more likely to reverse Environmental Protection Agency
decisions than Republican judges).
107. See supra notes 28-29, 37-38 and accompanying text.
I 08. Supra Part III.B.l.
109. E.g., Jennifer F. Miller, Comment, Should Juries Hear Patent Cases?, 2004 DUKE L. &
TECH. L. REV. 4, 29 (2004).
110. See, e.g., AIPLA, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007, at 25-26 (noting the cost of a
high-stakes patent case is $3 million per side in legal fees pre-trial, and $5 million if the case goes
to trial).
Ill. See, e.g., Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1346 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that a "dissent is not controlling"). Still, dissents can plant the seeds of
change, either inside the court by bringing alternative views to another judge's attention or
outside the court by giving litigants or even policy makers ideas for future legal change. See
Flanders, supra note 52, at 408--09.
112. See Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn't Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of
Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 718-19, 719 n.28
(2009) (collecting cases from various circuits in support of the proposition that "[t]he law of the
circuit rule provides that the decision of one panel is the decision of the court and binds all future
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the best metric for determining how willing a court of appeals is to
innovate new legal rules, percolate these concepts, and then
eventually adopt them in future decisions.
The results indicate that the Federal Circuit does not exhibit
much willingness to change its law through en bane review when
compared with the Tenth and Ninth Circuits. 113 But there are three
other circuits-the Third, Fifth, and D.C Circuits-that have
percentages of en bane review that are indistinguishable when
compared with those for the Federal Circuit. 114 This indicates that the
Federal Circuit is not alone. Accordingly, perhaps nothing much can
be inferred from the Federal Circuit's low rate of en bane review.
Still, it is odd that the court with such a high percentage of
dissents is among the courts granting en bane review with the lowest
frequency. This implies that there exist many disagreements among
judges that never rise to the level of prompting en bane review for
resolution. 115 Such a situation does not necessarily mean there is
uniformity in thought in the Federal Circuit, but it may mean that the
law becomes entrenched and infrequently changes.
It could be that the disputes at the Federal Circuit are minor
disputes and thus not in need of en bane review for resolution. This
study certainly does not provide any information to test this
hypothesis. One of the standards for en bane review is that the legal
question at issue be one of significant importance. 116 For this to
explain the low en bane review rate in comparison with the Ninth
Circuit, for example, would mean that the Ninth Circuit handles
more significant legal issues than the Federal Circuit, which seems
unlikely. At best, this explanation could account for some portion of
the low percentage of en bane opinions, but not all of it.
Other data, particularly the data Petherbridge observed in his
2009 study, suggest another hypothesis. Petherbridge observed actual
doctrinal differences in the area of the doctrine of equivalents from

panels unless and until the panel's opinion is reversed or overruled, either by the circuit sitting en
bane or the Supreme Court").
113. See supra Part Ill.B.2.
114. !d.
115. Notably, the Federal Circuit is not alone in this regard. The D.C. Circuit's en bane rate is
essentially the same as the Federal Circuit's. See supra Part III.B.2. Also, like the Federal Circuit,
the D.C. Circuit experiences a relatively high rate of dissent. See supra Part III.B.1.
116. FED. R. APP. P. 35.
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panel to panel 117 and judge to judge. 118 Similarly, in their 2004 study,
Wagner and Petherbridge observed the same difference in the area of
claim interpretation. 119 These are substantive areas of patent law in
which there appears to be disagreement among the judges. 120 There is
an actual difference as to either what the law is or how it should be
applied. And, as Petherbridge points out in his 2009 study, this
disharmony continues and remains uncorrected at the Federal
Circuit. 121 These observations fall in line with a high rate of dissent
accompanied by a low rate of en bane grants. The Federal Circuit
articulates much disagreement, but is not resolving it.
The Federal Circuit, however, may be harmonizing, or at least
attempting to harmonize the law, but if so, it is doing so in a
relatively untransparent fashion. One mechanism the court employs
to harmonize the law is its eight-day comment period on all
precedential opinions. 122 Every precedential panel opinion is
circulated to all members of the court, who can then comment on the
panel's decision and, presumably, point out any potential conflicts
the new decision would create. 123 Through this process, conflicts or
potential disagreements regarding Federal Circuit law can be
resolved without en bane review.
Through this full-court review mechanism, or simply
unprompted action by the panel itself, 124 the law can become
harmonized in a more sub-rosa fashion. Thus, the low rate of en bane
review does not mean that the law has become entrenched; rather, it
just means that the law changes via other means, which are either
less orderly or less transparent than en bane reviews.
The conjecture that the law changes by means other than en
bane review rebuts the critique that the law becomes entrenched in
the Federal Circuit and is not easily changed. But change in circuit
117. Petherbridge, supra note 3, at 445-49.
118. /d. at 455-56.
119. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 3, at 1170.
120. See, e.g., Petherbridge, supra note 3, at 428.
121. !d.
122. See Overview of the Federal Circuit-After Serving Internship at the Court, CURRENT
DEV. (Ctr. for Advanced Study on Intellectual Prop., Seattle, Wash.), Winter 2003, at 2
(describing the eight-day comment period).
123. !d.
124. Panels can change the law under the table by slowly steering the law in another direction
to get in line with current thinking.
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law outside en bane review can be problematic. Just as in other
circuits, and rooted in the concept of stare decisis, a Federal Circuit
panel must follow the decisions of previous panels. 125 The only way
such earlier decisions can be ignored is through en bane action. 126
The data from this study may suggest that this rule of law is not
being observed. Later panels are changing the law, or the court is
doing so as a whole through the comment process, as opposed to
doing so via en bane review. This possibility would not be all that
surprising given that some have critiqued the court for failing to
resolve disagreements through en bane review. 127 However, such a
conclusion stands on the premise, with which some disagree, 128 that
the state of legal doctrine within the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence
is without internal conflict or at least is getting there. Studies such as
those by Wagner and Petherbridge in 2004 and by Petherbridge in
2009 suggest otherwise. 129
V. CONCLUSION

This study provides further insight into the development of
jurisprudence at the Federal Circuit and how the individual judges
participate in such development. Based on this study, the Federal
Circuit does not appear as monolithic in its thought as some
commentators suggest. There is a good deal of dissent in comparison
with other courts of appeals. Judges on the court are willing to voice
their opinions as much as, if not more than, judges on other circuit
courts. This suggests that there are diverse views among those on the
court and that judges are willing to play an active and vocal role in
the law's development.
The en bane data make this picture more complex and are
worthy. of additional study. While the court seems to grant en bane
125. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[W]e note that
decisions of a three-judge panel of this court cannot overturn prior precedential decisions.").
Some have called this concept "horizontal stare decisis." See. e.g., Sloan, supra note 112, at 717.
126. See UMC Elec. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("A panel of
this court is bound by prior precedential decisions unless and until overturned in bane."); Sloan,
supra note 112, at 718-19.
127. See, e.g., Robin Feldman, Plain Language Patents, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 289,
299-300 (2009) ("Most troubling, the Federal Circuit has proven incapable of resolving the
disagreements and inconsistencies that arise within the circuit, allowing splits among panels to
fester unresolved across decades.").
128. See, e.g., supra note 28.
129. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.

Spring 2010]

DETERMINING UNIFORMITY

825

review at about the same rate as most of the other circuits studied,
when the data are considered in the context of the high rate of
individual panel dissents, the results are troubling. In fact, the dissent
data suggest that the exact opposite of the current thinking on the
court's behavior may be true: rather than suffering from too much
uniformity, the Federal Circuit actually lacks uniformity in its
thought on legal issues but fails to use the en bane review process to
resolve these disagreements.
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